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I. INTRODUCTION
Child sexual abuse' prosecutions present distinctive evidentiary
problems. Often these cases pit the word of a traumatized child
against that of an adult.2 Child sexual abuse typically occurs in pri-
vate, when the abuser is confident that there will be no witnesses.
1. For the purposes of this Comment, "child sexual abuse" will be used to describe
forced, tricked, or coerced sexual activity between a person sixteen years old or less and a
substantially older person. See Richard J. Gelles & Jon R. Conte, Domestic Violence and
Sexual Abuse of Children: A Review of Research in the Eighties, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
1045, 1050 (1990); David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants
in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray Into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence,
77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8-9 (1986) [hereinafter McCord, Foray]. Because a
substantially higher number of girls are abused than boys, and because boys are less likely than
girls to report abuse, most of the behavioral science research and reported opinions focus on
female sexual abuse victims. See id at 8. Thus, throughout this Comment, the victim will be
referred to as "she."
2. Rebecca J. Roe, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV.
97, 97 (1985). For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the child complainant
involved in a sexual abuse prosecution actually was abused. See infra section II.A.3. for
discussion regarding false accusations of sexual abuse.
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Therefore, the child victim is usually the only eyewitness.3 The prose-
cution's case is severely hampered if the court finds the child to be too
young to be a witness or incompetent to testify.4 Even if the child
does testify, several factors often limit the effectiveness of this testi-
mony. The child's cognitive and verbal abilities may not enable her to
give consistent, spontaneous, and detailed reports of her sexual
abuse.5 A child who must testify against a trusted adult, such as a
parent or relative, may experience feelings of fear and ambivalence,
and may retract her story because of family pressures or insensitivities
in the legal process.6
Prosecutors face another dilemma when offering the child victim
as a witness if the child has delayed reporting the abuse.7 Jurors may
interpret delayed disclosure as evidence of fabrication, especially if
defense counsel suggests this conclusion during cross-examination of
the child.' Furthermore, jurors may hold misconceptions that a child
has memory deficits, is suggestible, cannot distinguish between fact or
fantasy, or is likely to fabricate sexual experiences with adults.9 These
problems are compounded by the lack of corroborative physical or
3. See John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68
NEB. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989); Veronica Serrato, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: A Spectrum of Uses, 68 B.U. L. REV. 155, 158 (1988).
4. Josephine Bulkley, Legal Proceedings, Reforms, and Emerging Issues in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 6 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 153, 155 (1988) [hereinafter Bulkley, Legal
Proceedings]. Sometimes the prosecutor or the child's family determines that the child should
not testify because of the additional trauma that may result from testifying. A child who
testifies must face the defendant, the jury, and the public in court while under intense direct
and cross-examination. Id. at 157. The child also may be subjected to delays and long waiting
periods before she can testify. Id. If the defendant is convicted, the child may feel guilt for
testifying against the defendant, who may be a parent or relative. Id. at 155. If the defendant
is acquitted, the child may feel a sense of hopelessness and face possible reprisals by the
offender. Id. at 155-56.
5. Serrato, supra note 3, at 159.
6. See id. at 159-60; Bulkley, Legal Proceedings, supra note 4, at 155.
7. See Roland C. Summit, M.D., The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 181, 186 (1983). Contrary to the general expectation that a
sexually abused child would seek help, the child often does not report the abuse out of fear of
being blamed for the incident or fear that no one will able to protect her from retaliation by the
abuser. Id. at 181. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text for discussion regarding the
child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.
8. Serrato, supra note 3, at 160-61.
9. Bulkley, Legal Proceedings, supra note 4, at 155. In addition to the particular
problems facing sexually abused children as witnesses are those commonly facing all child
witnesses. Serrato, supra note 3, at 161. Children often are confused by dates, times, and
frequencies of events. As a result of this confusion, a cross-examiner can lead a child to
contradict previous statements with questions not phrased in age-appropriate language. Jurors
may interpret a child's apparent confusion, hesitancy, and inconsistency as indicative of
unreliability. Id.
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medical evidence in many child sexual abuse cases.1" Faced with
these unique problems, prosecutors have increasingly relied on mental
health professionals to bolster child sexual abuse cases with expert
psychological testimony."1
Only since the early 1980s have appellate courts addressed the
special evidentiary problems of child sexual abuse prosecutions. Prior
to the 1980s, the media rarely discussed and the public little under-
stood the subject of child sexual abuse. 12 Society regarded child sex-
ual abuse as a rather uncommon problem until the late 1970s, when
the women's movement and the child protection movement succeeded
in drawing public attention to what statistics were indicating was a
problem of significant proportions.'3 The increasing public awareness
of child sexual abuse and the new candor born of the sexual revolu-
tion then paved the way for the media's "discovery" of child sexual
abuse. 4 By the mid-80s, the once undiscussed subject had become
"something of a national obsession.""'s The onslaught of media cover-
age, the resulting perception of child sexual abuse as a major social
problem, and the passage of mandatory reporting laws'6 all brought
an increased number of reported cases of child sexual abuse to the
criminal justice system. 17
The battle to win public recognition of child sexual abuse as a
10. Only 10 to 50 percent of cases involve physical or medical evidence of child sexual
abuse. Myers et al., supra note 3, at 34 n. 120. Often the abuser has used threats and
intimidation, rather than actual violence, to induce the child's submission. Serrato, supra note
3, at 159.
11. Bruce Gardner, Prosecutors Should Think Twice-Before Using Experts in Child Sex
Abuse Cases, 3 CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (1988). Most often, experts in child sexual abuse cases are
social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, and pediatricians. This Comment will use the
term "mental health professional" to refer to all of these professionals.
12. DAVID HECHLER, THE BATTLE AND THE BACKLASH: THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
WAR 3-5 (1988).
13. DAVID FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 1, 3
(1984). From 1976 to 1982, the number of child sexual abuse cases reported to the nationwide
data collection system of the American Humane Association increased from 1,975 to 22,918.
Id. at 1. Currently, there are more than 445,000 cases of physical and child sexual abuse
reported every year involving parents, baby-sitters, day care workers, and other caregivers.
Christopher Scanlan, A Child's Word, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 5, 1991, at IC.
14. See HECHLER, supra note 12, at 6.
15. Andrew Cohen, Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical
Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEO. L.J. 429, 429 (1985). For example, in 1984,
ABC World News Tonight focused on sexual abuse in a five-part series, CBS' Sixty Minutes ran
two stories on sexual abuse, and the Washington Post ran a front-page story on one family's
experience with sexual abuse. In addition, the media publicized sexual abuse charges against
seven former teachers at the McMartin Preschool in Manhattan Beach, California, and against
24 adults in Jordan, Minnesota throughout 1984 and 1985. Id. at 429-30 n.3.
16. See Gardner, supra note 11, at 13.
17. See McCord, Foray, supra note 1, at 5.
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social problem has been followed by an equally strong backlash.
Notorious cases alleging mass molestation in Jordan, Minnesota and
at the McMartin Preschool in California polarized the camps.18
Many have claimed that an atmosphere of hysteria has led to an epi-
demic of "sex accuse"-that "what we see now is a blizzard of false
accusations." 19 Often, the admissibility of expert testimony in a child
sexual abuse case depends on the relative weight the court places on
the consequences of failing to detect actual abuse versus the conse-
quences of false accusations. A California appellate court has
expressed the competing concerns:
Thus there is very substantial conflict between two important goals
of society. On the one hand is the need to care and treat an abused
child and the need as a treatment device to accept as true his report
whether truthful or not; and on the other hand the preservation of
the constitutional right to presumption of innocence in a criminal
case.
20
In light of these concerns, courts and legal commentators have
begun to question the role of the expert witness in a child sexual abuse
prosecution. Unless the expert's opinion meets a threshold level of
reliability, it cannot assist the jury. 2I Expert testimony regarding
18. HECHLER, supra note 12, at xiii.
19. Id. at 1.
20. People v. Leon, 263 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); see also State v. Rimmasch,
775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), where the court noted:
We are aware that child sexual abuse is of great concern to the American
public....
However, the fact that child sexual abuse has emerged as a critical problem
about which the public is seriously concerned does not mean all legal rules that
may constitute obstacles to increasing the conviction and incarceration rates of
those accused of such crimes, as opposed to those actually guilty, can properly be
brushed aside. Fundamental changes in long-standing evidentiary rules should
not be made lightly ....
Id. at 390.
Another court has observed that "a sexual abuse charge by itself imposes a stigma on the
accused and conviction provides a serious penalty. In interpreting our rules of evidence, we
must be aware not only of the needs of society in general but also the defendant's right to a fair
trial." Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 275 (Del. 1987).
21. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence generally governs the admissibility of expert
testimony in the federal courts: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702 (emphasis added).
Although the majority of child sexual abuse prosecutions are brought in the state courts,
nearly all the 29 states that have adopted rules of evidence modeled on the Federal Rules have
followed this treatment of expert witnesses either exactly or in substantial measure. Michael
H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and The Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate
Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 43 (1986). Courts generally exclude
testimony that does not meet this threshold level of reliability on the ground that it is based on
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child sexual abuse presents particular reliability problems for several
reasons." Perhaps most importantly, research indicates that no typi-
cal child sexual abuse victim exists, thus furnishing doubt that mental
health professionals have any expertise to diagnose child sexual abuse
and to offer expert opinion on the subject.23 Often, mental health pro-
fessionals who testify in court have little understanding of their role as
an expert witness. Furthermore, recent studies have indicated that
mental health professionals may encourage false accusations of sexual
abuse through improper interviewing methods.24
In response to the problems associated with expert testimony in
child sexual abuse prosecutions, courts generally have restricted its
admissibility. Whether or not a jurisdiction permits the testimony
often depends on the purpose for which the prosecutor offers it. The
types of testimony offered generally fall into four categories. 25 With
the first type of testimony, the expert evaluates the credibility of the
child and asserts that the child's allegations of abuse are truthful
("Type 1"1).26 With the second type, the expert offers a direct opinion
that the child has been abused ("Type 2").27 With the third type, the
expert describes certain behavioral characteristics, such as night-
mares, difficulty sleeping or concentrating, or withdrawal from social
relationships and activities, as consistent with being abused ("Type
3"1).21 Finally, with the fourth type, the expert explains behaviors of
the child, such as delay in reporting or recantation of the allegations,
that are seemingly inconsistent with abuse in order to rebut the impli-
cation that the child's allegations are false ("Type 4").29 This last
type of testimony is based--either by name or in concept--on the
"child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome" (CSAAS). 3 With
conjecture or speculation. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES,
ILLUSTRATIONS, AND PROBLEMS 249 (rev. 2d ed. 1989).
22. See infra part II.A.
23. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
25. Legal commentators have devised various methods for categorizing the various forms
of expert testimony offered in child sexual abuse prosecutions. See, e.g., McCord, Foray, supra
note 1, at 41-61; David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New
Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66
OR. L. REV. 19, 41-48 (1987) [hereinafter McCord, Syndromes]; Myers et al., supra note 3, at
32-142; Serrato, supra note 3, at 163-91. The categories described here were chosen for their
broad relevance and are listed in the order in which they impact on the ultimate issue in the
case: whether the defendant committed the alleged incident(s) of sexual abuse against the
child complainant.
26. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
30. See infra note 102.
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Types 3 and 4, the expert either limits the testimony to an explanation
of general principles or applies these principles to the facts of the
case. 31
Courts unanimously exclude Type 1 testimony,32 and only a few
courts allow Type 2 testimony.33 Courts are split on the admissibility
of Type 3 testimony.34 The overwhelming majority of courts permit
Type 4 testimony.35
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has adopted the most
31. See infra notes 236-41, 251-54 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g, State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73 (Ariz. 1986); People v. Gaffney, 769 P.2d 1081
(Colo. 1989); Tingle v. State, 536 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1988); Head v. State, 519 N.E.2d 151 (Ind.
1988); State v. Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1986); State v. Jackson, 721 P.2d 232 (Kan.
1986); Hester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1987); Commonwealth v. Ianello, 515
N.E.2d 1181 (Mass. 1987); People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1990); Townsend v.
State, 734 P.2d 705 (Nev. 1987); State v. Bailey, 365 S.E.2d 651 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); State v.
Milbradt, 756 P.2d 620 (Or. 1988); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989); State v.
Madison, 770 P.2d 662 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988). For
a further list of cases, see State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172, 188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
33. See, e.g., Broderick v. King's Way Assembly of God, 808 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1991);
Matter of Cheryl H., 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d
212 (Fla. 1988); State v. Hester, 760 P.2d 27 (Idaho 1988); Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d 705
(Nev. 1987); State v. Timperio, 528 N.E.2d 594 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). Most courts exclude
Type 2 testimony indirectly' by allowing Type 3 testimony with the qualification that the expert
not opine that the child was abused. See, e.g., State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989);
State v. Gokey, 574 A.2d 766 (Vt. 1990); State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123 (W. Va.
1990).
34. For cases allowing Type 3 testimony, see United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417 (8th
Cir. 1987); Rodriguez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Ward v. State, 519 So.
2d 1082 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1988); State v. Reser, 767 P.2d 1277 (Kan. 1989); State v. Davis, 422
N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Dana, 416 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In
re Nicole V., 518 N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 1987); State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989);
State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123 (W. Va. 1990); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973
(Wyo. 1988). Compare Nelson v. State, 782 P.2d 290, 297-99 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (Ariz. 1986); Russell v. State, 712 S.W.2d 916 (Ark. 1986); People
v. Jeff, 251 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1988);
People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1990); State v. Hudnall, 359 S.E.2d 59 (S.C. 1987);
State v. Gokey, 574 A.2d 766 (Vt. 1990); State v. Jensen, 415 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987).35. See, e.g., Bostic v. State, 772 P.2d 1089 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); State v. Moran, 728
P.2d 248 (Ariz. 1986); People v. Leon, 263 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Spigarolo, 556 A.2d 112 (Conn. 1989); Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269 (Del. 1987); Allison v.
State, 353 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. 1987); People v. Server, 499 N.E.2d 1019 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); State
v. Tonn, 441 N.W.2d 403 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1988);
People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1990); State v. Garden, 404 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987); Smith v. State, 688 P.2d 326 (Nev. 1984); State v. Bailey, 365 S.E.2d 651 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1988); People v. Benjamin R., 481 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. 1984); State v. Middleton, 657
P.2d 1215 (Or. 1983); Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); State v.
Hicks, 535 A.2d 776 (Vt. 1987); State v. Madison, 770 P.2d 662 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); State
v. Jensen, 415 N.W.2d 519 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988).
For a further list of cases, see State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d at 183. But see Brown v. Commonwealth,
812 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1991); Dunnington v. State, 740 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
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restrictive position on admissibility in the nation. In the case of Com-
monwealth v. Garcia,36 the court held that expert testimony explain-
ing the reasons for a child's delayed reporting of sexual abuse-Type
4 testimony-impermissibly infringes on the credibility-determining
function of the jury.37 With this holding, the court, as Judge Ford
Elliott lamented in his dissent, "effectively [drove] the expert from the
courtroom in cases involving the sexual abuse of children. '38
This Comment argues that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
has adopted an unnecessarily extreme position. Part II acknowledges
the distinctive reliability problems of expert testimony regarding child
sexual abuse, and describes national trends in limiting its admissibil-
ity. Part III explains the development of the case law in the Penn-
sylvania courts, and analyzes the Superior Court of Pennsylvania's
recent opinion in Commonwealth v. Garcia. Part IV criticizes the
basis of the Garcia holding, arguing that neither precedent nor social
science research warranted the court's elimination of the type of testi-
mony offered. This Part describes approaches taken by other jurisdic-
tions to limit the problems associated with expert testimony regarding
child sexual abuse without completely eliminating the expert from the
courtroom. Finally, Part V concludes that courts should not permit
expert testimony of the first three types described above unless and
until social science research finds scientifically reliable indicators of
child sexual abuse, and the mental health profession can show that its
members who testify in child sexual abuse prosecutions can compe-
tently make reliable judgments based on this research. Courts should,
however, admit testimony based on the child sexual abuse accommo-
dation syndrome when such testimony is limited solely to explaining
seemingly unusual behaviors of the child in order to rebut the infer-
ence that the child has fabricated the allegations. 39
Testimony based on the child sexual abuse accommodation syn-
drome is a necessary consequence of the peculiarities of the child sex-
ual abuse case. This Comment encourages prosecutors to use expert
testimony to communicate the body of knowledge that has developed
regarding the coping behaviors of child sexual abuse victims so that a
jury can better understand why a child would delay in reporting an
incident of abuse or recant her allegations. Prosecutors and courts
must work to carefully confine expert testimony in child sexual abuse
36. 588 A.2d 951 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 604 A.2d 248 (Pa. 1992).
37. Id. at 956.
38. Id. (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting).
39. A recent article on a child sexual abuse case decided by the Michigan Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion. See generally Monique K. Cirelli, Expert Testimony in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases: Helpful or Prejudicial?, 8 COOLEY L. REV. 425 (1991).
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prosecutions to that based on the child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome in order to balance the competing needs of protecting the
child from further victimization and the defendant from false accusa-
tion and imprisonmnent.
II. RECOGNIZING AND RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEMS
A. Reliability Problems of the Testimony
Many commentators have argued for the exclusion or limitation
of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases. 40 In a recent study on
child sexual abuse commissioned by the National Institute of Justice,
Debra Whitcomb called the increasing reliance on expert witnesses
"[a]mong the most disturbing trends in the prosecution of child sex-
ual abuse cases .... , In the admirable pursuit of protecting our
youngest victims, the legal system often allows the prosecution to
admit unreliable 42 expert testimony against a defendant accused of
sexually abusing a child.
1. LACK OF RESEARCH RESULTS
Perhaps the foremost reason for doubting the reliability of expert
testimony in child sexual abuse cases is that the study of child sexual
abuse is relatively new and many theories are not yet empirically sup-
ported.43 Behavioral scientists did not begin to study intensively the
problem of child sexual abuse until the late 1970s.44 These studies
have revealed the absence of a single, typical child sexual abuse vic-
tim. 45 Review of the research to date indicates that the type and
severity of children's reactions vary greatly.46 In fact, almost every
study of the impact of sexual abuse on children has found a substan-
40. See, e.g., Josephine A. Bulkley, The Prosecution's Use of Social Science Expert
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: National Trends and Recommendations, 1 J. CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 73 (1992) [hereinafter Bulkley, Social Science]; Gary B. Melton & Susan
Limber, Psychologists' Involvement in Cases of Child Maltreatment: Limits of Role and
Expertise, 44 AM. PSYCH. 1225 (1989).
41. See DEBRA WHITCOMB, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD 111 (National Institute of
Justice 1992); see also Diana Younts, Evaluating and Admitting Expert Opinion Testimony in
Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 41 DUKE L.J. 691 (1991).
42. "Reliability" is used throughout this Comment in two senses. First, in a scientific
sense, it refers to consistency; that is, whether the same diagnosis is made over time and among
different clinicians. See David Faust & Jay Ziskin, Challenging Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Claims, 38 DEF. L.J. 407, 408 (1989). It is also used in the evidentiary sense that testimony
must be reliable in order to assist the jury, as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
43. See, e.g., WHITCOMB, supra note 41, at 11; Bulkley, Social Science, supra note 40, at
81.
44. McCord, Foray, supra note 1, at 82.
45. Bulkley, Social Science, supra note 40, at 82.
46. Myers, supra note 3, at 55.
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tial group of victims with little or no symptomatology.47 In addition,
certain behaviors may seem to indicate some other traumatic event or
behavior of normal children.48
Methodological weaknesses in the existing studies of child sexual
abuse also contribute to the questionable reliability of testimony. In
1986, researchers Browne and Finkelhor suggested that many of the
then-available studies on child sexual abuse had sample, design, and
measurement problems that might invalidate the findings.4 9 One
methodological concern stems from the fact that many of the sexually
abused children studied were receiving psychological services." This
type of self-selected group may not be representative of all sexually
abused children."1 Furthermore, many of the studies did not use stan-
dardized measures of psychological disturbance and did not employ
comparison groups.5 2 Without comparison data, it is impossible to
conclude that observed effects significantly differentiate abused from
non-abused children. 3 As a result of the lack of definitive research
results, several commentators have expressed doubts concerning pro-
fessional competence to diagnose a child as having been sexually
abused and to determine whether a child's behaviors are consistent
with sexual abuse.5 4
47. David Finkelhor, Early and Long-Term Effects of Child Sexual Abuse: An Update, 21
PROF. PSYCH. REs. & PRAC. 325, 327 (1990).
48. Bulkley, Social Science, supra note 40, at 82. Several recent studies (since 1988) have
produced a few consistent results. Sexually abused children are consistently more behaviorally
distressed than nonabused children. Myers, supra note 3, at 58. In addition, of the numerous
reactions observed in sexually abused children, sexual behavior has the closest logical
association with sexual abuse. Id. at 59.
Researchers also have compiled lists of variables that may affect a child's reactions to
sexual abuse. Studies have shown that the closer the relationship between the offender and the
child, the more intrusive the form of sexual behavior, the longer the duration of the abuse, the
more frequent the episodes of abuse, and the greater the use of force, the greater the traumatic
impact on the child. Angela Browne & David Finkelhor, Impact of Child Sexual Abuse: A
Review of the Research, 99 PSYCH. BULL. 66, 72-75 (1986). Although these findings were
reported in a 1986 review, Finkelhor notes in a'1990 update that "most of the new research has
simply reinforced and consolidated what the earlier research had found." Finkelhor, supra
note 47, at 325.
49. Browne & Finkelhor, supra note 48, at 75.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 76.
53. Id. Professor Myers observed that by 1989, several studies had achieved a more sound
methodology and were beginning to provide a more complete picture of the effects of child
sexual abuse. See Myers, supra note 3, at 325. In a 1990 article, Finkelhor agreed that more
sophisticated studies were available. See Finkelhor, supra note 47, at 325.
54. See, e.g., McCord, Foray, supra note 1, at 38. Commentators also have criticized the
qualifications, or lack thereof, of mental health professionals who testify as experts in child
sexual abuse prosecutions. See, e.g., Ken Englade, Mad Science: When it Comes to
Psychological Testimony, Everybody's an Expert. So Who Does a Jury Believe?, 32 STUDENT
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2. CONFLICTING ROLES OF THE EXPERT WITNESS
Mental health professionals who testify as experts in child sexual
abuse cases often do not understand that their role as an expert wit-
ness differs greatly from their role in the course of their normal prac-
tice."5 For treatment purposes, the mental health professional is
trained to rely heavily on the reported feelings of the child and to base
therapy on an assumption that abuse has occurred. 56 However, a
determination that the child meets the clinical criteria for sexual
abuse does not establish satisfaction of the legal criteria.5 7 The fact
that a child honestly feels abused (the matter of primary clinical sig-
nificance) does not necessarily indicate that the legal offense of child
abuse has been committed." Furthermore, a determination that the
child was abused at some point in time does not prove that the child
was abused by the defendant at the particular point in question.59 A
mental health professional who testifies as an expert must determine
objective reality-i.e., whether the child exhibits certain symptoms, or
whether the child was abused (depending on which types of testimony
the jurisdiction allows)-rather than focus on the child's subjective
feelings." Mental health professionals who enter the forensic arena
also must leave their more familiar role as the child's helping agent
LAW. 31, 33(1990); Robert J. Levy, Using "Scientific" Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse,
23 FAM. L.Q. 383, 395; Myers, supra note 3, at 11-12; see also Guidelines for the Clinical
Evaluation of Child and Sexual Abuse, 27 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY
655, 655 (1988) (recognizing that "the legal profession is often confronted with an array of
self-identified experts who have emerged to fill the void").
55. David Glasgow & Richard P. Bentall, What Do Expert Witnesses in Child Sexual
Abuse Think They Are Doing?-"Diagnosis" and The Sexually Accurate Doll "Test" As
Professional Myths, 11 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 43, 43 (1989). Law professors Bonnie and
Slobogin summarized the confusion between the clinical and forensic tasks of a mental health
professional:
Many clinicians have no business in the courtroom. Their training in clinical
methods of inquiry and treatment encourages them to err in the direction of
diagnosing illness, invites many of them to speculate wildly about unconscious
determinants of behavior, and frequently discourages systematic theoretical
inquiry. Many clinicians are not sensitive to the limitations of their own
disciplines; if they are not researchers, they focus on what they think they know
rather than on what they do not know. More important, many clinicians are
entirely untrained in, and insensitive to, the purposes and limitations of the legal
process.
Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the
Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427; 457 (1980).
56. Lee Coleman & Patrick E. Clancy, False Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse, 5 CRIM.
JUST. 14, 16 (1990).
57. David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241
SCIENCE 31, 32 (1988) [hereinafter Faust & Ziskin, Expert Witness].
58. Melton & Limber, supra note 40, at 1229.
59. Id.
60. Faust & Ziskin, Expert Witness, supra note 57, at 32.
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and instead seek to uncover the truth, regardless of its implications
for the child's treatment.61 The mental health professional thus
becomes a potential adversary to the child, and the professional's
ingrained tendency to support or empathize with the child may cloud
objectivity.62 In fact, the value systems of law and psychology
directly conflict:
The law demands precision, concise answers, and prefers yes or no
formulations. Psychology, on the other hand, emphasizes process,
behavior in change over time, prefers to review all relevant hypoth-
eses and rule out irrelevant alternatives. The legal focus is on rule
and order, concrete facts, on maintaining rights, and doing justice
.... In psychology, the goal becomes needs, not rights, and the
mode is collaborative, not adversarial . . . . It is reasonable to
assume that the movement from one arena to the other will be
fraught with some measure of difficulty and discomfort.63
Neither the "Ethical Principles of Psychologists" ' nor the
"Guidelines for the Clinical Evaluation of Child and Adolescent Sex-
ual Abuse ' 65 provide mental health professionals with guidance in
fulfilling the role of an expert witness. In fact, no set of standards
govern mental health expert testimony that can be enforced
officially.66
On the other side of the spectrum are those experts who under-
stand their role in the courtroom all too well. Courts and commenta-
61. Id.
62. Id. The Supreme Court of Michigan recognized this problem in People v. Beckley, 456
N.W.2d 391, 408 (Mich. 1990):
Given the abhorrence of [child sexual abuse], it is inevitable that those who treat
a child victim will have an emotional inclination toward protecting the child
victim. The expert who treats a child victim may lose some objectivity
concerning a particular case. Therefore to avoid the pitfall of a treating
professional being inclined to give an opinion regarding whether the complaining
witness had been sexually abused, we caution the trial court to carefully
scrutinize the treating professional's ability to aid the trier of fact when
exercising discretion in qualifying such an expert witness.
63. Marian D. Hall, The Role of Psychologists as Experts in Cases Involving Allegations of
Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 451, 451-52 (1989); see also J. Alexander Tanford, The
Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. LJ. 137, 157
(1990).
Conversely, part of the problem is that lawyers and judges are equally ignorant of and
insensitive to clinical processes. Cf McCord, Syndromes, supra note 25, at 26. Most lawyers
and judges lack extensive scientific training or experience and are uncomfortable dealing with
scientific matters. Id. at 25. See also Englade, supra note 54, at 32 ("In many courtrooms,
psychiatry and psychology have little more respect than crystal-gazing or tea-leaf reading.").
64. Ethical Principles of Psychologists, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 390 (1990).
65. Guidelines for the Clinical Evaluation of Child and Adolescent Sexual Abuse, supra
note 54, at 655.
66. Englade, supra note 54, at 36.
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tors alike have expressed concern about the venality of experts
testifying in all types of cases.67 Some mental health professionals, in
their normal role of zealous child advocate, may blindly testify to
whatever the prosecution desires.68
3. IMPROPER INTERVIEWING METHODS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR
FALSE ACCUSATIONS
Both mental health and legal professionals have expressed con-
cern about so-called improper methods of interviewing children and
their potential "contaminating" effects upon the child's memory and
the validity of the child's reports.6 a Improper interviewing methods
may even cause children to make false accusations of sexual abuse.7°
For example, Coleman and Clancy, a public defender and a practicing
psychiatrist, speak of a widespread occurrence of false accusations of
child sexual abuse.71 In their experience in reviewing hundreds of
allegations and about 1,500 hours of audiotaped and videotaped inter-
views with children being investigated for possible abuse, they found
that children quite regularly made allegations that could be proven
factually false. 2 They assert that, in most cases, the interviewing
style leads the child gradually to construct a mental picture of abuse.
This picture then becomes the child's "memory. ' 73 Thus, it is diffi-
cult to determine whether the child's statements are based on memo-
ries of real events or on a mental image created by suggestive
questioning.74 The fact that most interviews are not taped, or are
taped only after many sessions have taken place, exacerbates the
problem."
A report published in 1991 by the American Psychological Asso-
ciation titled "The Suggestibility of Children's Recollections" also
suggests that adults can manipulate young children into making false
accusations. 76 The report indicates that under persistent and accusa-
67. Graham, supra note 21, at 45. See Walter Olson, The Case Against Expert Witnesses,
FORTUNE, Sept. 25, 1989, for a discussion of the increased use of expert witnesses in all types
of cases. Webster's Dictionary defines "venal" as "capable of being bought or obtained for
money or other valuable consideration...; open to corrupt influence .... WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2539 (1976).
68. Graham, supra note 21, at 45.
69. See Bulkley, Legal Proceedings, supra note 4, at 176.
70. See Mary de Young, A Conceptual Model for Judging the Truthfulness of a Young
Child's Allegation of Sexual Abuse, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 550, 551 (1986).
71. Coleman & Clancy, supra note 56, at 15.
72. Id. at 18.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 19.
76. Scanlan, supra note 13, at IC.
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tory questioning by an adult, an interviewer can influence a child to
conform her story to the interviewer's version." In addition, the
juries in two highly publicized child sexual abuse trials, involving the
founder of the McMartin Preschool in Manhattan Beach, California
and a baby-sitter at the Old Cutler Presbyterian Church in Miami,
Florida, explained their acquittals by citing the leading and suggestive
questions of psychologists who interviewed the children.7
Significantly, the research done to date has been confined to
highly controlled laboratory situations and does not involve a number
of factors that tend to make children less prone to suggestibility: (1) a
personally significant, meaningful event in which the child is actively
involved; (2) a real-life event; (3) questions about central information;
(4) an event lasting more than a few seconds; (5) a repeated event; and
(6) possibly a traumatic event. 79  Another commentator also has
noted that "[w]hen an event is salient, is experienced directly, and is
well understood, children are likely to be more resistant to misleading
inquiries than when the child is unsure or uninterested in what
occurred."8 These findings indicate that a child's resistance to sug-
gestive questioning may be very high for questions involving impor-
tant events, especially those related to sexual abuse.
B. National Case Law Trends on Admissibility of the Testimony
In response to the reliability problems of expert testimony in
child sexual abuse prosecutions, courts have limited its admissibility.
Courts have acted consistently nationwide in excluding an expert's
opinion that the child has testified truthfully (Type 1).8' These courts
have espoused several arguments for holding such expert testimony
inadmissible-primarily that an expert opinion regarding witness
credibility has no more reliablility than a jury's determination of the
witness' credibility.8 2 In addition, courts have held credibility testi-
77. Id. In one series of experiments, a researcher posing as a janitor either cleaned a doll
or roughly played with it. Another researcher, posing as the janitor's boss, later asked a group
of five and six year old children if the man cleaned or played with the doll. All of the children
answered accurately under gentle and neutral questioning. However, under persistent and
ultimately accusatory questioning from the "boss"-who insisted that the janitor had played
with the doll and not cleaned it-ninety percent of the children eventually changed their
stories to conform to the boss' version. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 177; see also Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Hegelson, Child Sexual Assault:
Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 181 (1985).
80. Bulkley, Legal Proceedings, supra note 4, at 177 (quoting Gary B. Melton & Ross A.
Thompson, Getting out of a Rut: Detours to Less Traveled Paths in Child Witness Research, in
CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 209, 213 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1987)).
81. See supra note 32.
82. See, e.g., State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (Ariz. 1986); State v. Batangan, 799 P.2d
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mony inadmissible because it "is nothing more than the expert's opin-
ion on how the case should be decided, ' '8 3 and because it tempts the
jury to surrender their own common sense when evaluating credibility
to the opinion of the expert.84 Furthermore, some courts have rea-
soned that mental health professionals have no specialized knowledge
for discerning truth.8 5
Only a few courts permit an expert to directly opine that the
complainant was sexually abused (Type 2).86 In Townsend v. State,87
the Nevada Supreme Court articulated the typical reason for allowing
this type of testimony: "[I]t was proper for the State's expert to
express an opinion on the issue of whether the child had, in fact, been
sexually assaulted or abused. Such an opinion, although embracing
an ultimate issue, represents both the peculiar expertise and consum-
mate purpose of an expert's analysis.""8 The courts that allow an
expert to testify that the child has been sexually abused do not, how-
ever, allow the expert to further opine that the defendant was the
child's abuser.8 9
48, 54 (Haw. 1990); see also Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. 1986) ("The
question of whether a particular witness is testifying in a truthful manner is one that must be
answered in reliance upon inferences drawn from the ordinary experiences of life and common
knowledge as to the natural tendencies of human nature, as well as upon observations of the
demeanor and character of the witness.").
The Supreme Court of Oregon vigorously condemned the use of credibility testimony:
We have said before, and we will say it again, but this time with emphasis-we
really mean it-no psychotherapist may render an opinion on whether a witness is
credible in any trial conducted in this state. The assessment of credibility is for
the trier of fact and not for psychotherapists.
State v. Milbradt, 756 P.2d 620, 624 (Or. 1988).
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not permit an expert to testify as to whether another
witness is telling the truth. See FED. R. EvID. 704(a); GRAHAM, supra note 21, at 278.
83. See State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 253 (Ariz. 1986) (In most child sexual abuse cases,
where "the only evidence consists of the victim's accusation and the defendant's denial, expert
testimony on the question of who to believe is nothing more than advice to jurors on how to
decide the case.").
84. See, e.g., United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1986).
85. See People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 407 (Mich. 1990); see also State v. Rimmasch,
775 P.2d 388, 406 (Utah 1989) ("[N]othing has come to our attention suggesting a general
acceptance of the proposition that those who regularly treat symptoms of sexual abuse are
capable of determining with a high degree of reliability the truthfulness of allegations that one
has been abused.).
86. See supra note 33.
87. 734 P.2d 705 (Nev. 1987).
88. Id. at 708 (emphasis added). Note that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, expert
testimony is "not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact." FED. R. EvID. 704.
89. See, e.g., Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 221 (Fla. 1988); Townsend v. State, 734
P.2d 705, 708 (Nev. 1987); Matter of Cheryl H., 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(to allow such testimony is to assume that "peering into the mind of one person allows a
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Courts are divided on the admissibility of expert testimony that
the complainant's behavior is consistent with the behavior of a person
who has been sexually abused (Type 3).90 With this type of testi-
mony, the expert compares the complainant's behaviors or "symp-
toms" to those of known sexual abuse victims, but does not
specifically opine that the child in issue was abused. The expert may
explicitly match the behavioral characteristics of the child with the
criteria for the psychiatric diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD)91 or may just rely on PTSD as a general concept. Symptoms
of PTSD might include flashbacks, nightmares, numbing of affect, dif-
ficulty sleeping or concentrating, or withdrawal from social relation-
ships and activities. 92 The expert provides the jury with sexual abuse
psychiatrist not only to draw valid conclusions about the mental state and behavior of that
person but to draw equally valid conclusions about the conduct of another person").
Courts also have rejected expert testimony that seeks to establish that the defendant
matches a profile of the type of person who sexually abuses children. For example, the
Supreme Court of Washington prohibited expert testimony that in "eighty-five to ninety
percent of our cases, the child is molested by someone they already know" in a case where the
defendant was the child complainant's grandfather. The court so ruled because the testimony
invited the jury to conclude that the defendant's relationship to the victim made him
statistically more likely to have committed the crime. State v. Petrich, 683 P.2d 173, 180
(Wash. 1984).
90. See supra note 34.
91. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 248-49 (rev.
3d ed. 1987). PTSD comprises the following components: (1) an experience or event that
would be markedly distressing to almost anyone; (2) reexperiencing the traumatic event; (3)
avoiding stimuli associated with the trauma, or numbing of general responsiveness; (4)
persistent symptoms of increased arousal; i.e., difficulty falling asleep, irritability, difficulty
concentrating; and (5) duration of the disturbance of at least one month.
92. The complete diagnostic criteria for PTSD are as follows:
A. The person has experienced an event that is outside the range of usual
human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, e.g.,
serious threat to one's life or physical integrity; serious threat of harm to one's
children, spouse, or other close relatives and friends; sudden destruction of one's
home or community; or seeing another person who has recently been, or is being,
seriously injured or killed as the result of an accident or physical violence.
B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in at least one of the
following ways:
(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event
(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event
(3) sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring
(includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations,
and dissociative [flashback] episodes, even those that occur upon
awakening or when intoxicated)
(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to events that symbolize or
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event, including anniversaries of
the trauma.
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma or numbing
of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least
three of the following:
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as a possible cause of the child's behaviors. The theory underlying
this testimony is that a sexually abused child exhibits characteristics
not common to non-sexually abused children, 93 and that these charac-
teristics can be detected by a trained expert. 94
The courts that allow Type 3 testimony reason that it assists the
jury in understanding the child's behavior.95 Conversely, some juris-
dictions do not allow an expert to compare the complainant's behav-
iors to those of sexual abuse victims. This type of testimony implies
that because the child's behavior is consistent with abuse having
occurred, the crime charged must have been committed, even though
the child's behavior is only one factor in determining the defendant's
guilt.96 Also, such testimony permits the expert to indicate how he or
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings associated with the trauma
(2) efforts to avoid activities or situations that arouse recollections of the
trauma
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma (psychogenic
amnesia)
(4) markedly diminished interest in significant activities
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
(6) restricted range of affect, e.g., unable to have loving feelings
(7) sense of a foreshortened future, e.g., does not expect to have a career,
marriage, or children, or a long life.
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the
trauma), as indicated by at least two of the following:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger
(3) difficulty concentrating
(4) hypervigilance
(5) exaggerated startle response
(6) physiologic reactivity upon exposure to events that symbolize or
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in B, C, and D) of at least one
month).
Id.
93. Research indicates that some victims of child sexual abuse exhibit no symptoms or
symptoms common to nonabused children suffering from other stressors. See supra text
accompanying notes 46-48.
94. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ability of mental
health professionals to formulate reliable clinical judgments of whether a child has been
sexually abused.
95. See, e.g., Ward v. State, 519 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1988).
96. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 782 P.2d 290, 297-99 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (Ariz. 1986); State v. Jensen, 415 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987). This same concern was expressed by Judge Zehmer of the Ward court. See Ward, 519
So. 2d at 1087. Judge Zehmer emphasized that expert testimony comparing the child's
behavior to that of sexually abused children is only one factor in determining the defendant's
guilt:
The use of expert opinion testimony of the nature presented in this case must be
carefully controlled to prevent its misuse by the prosecution, thus becoming the
main feature of the trial, and eventually its misinterpretation by the jury during
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she views the credibility of the child.97 Although Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 704 permits expert testimony embracing an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact, the Rules do not permit an expert to offer
an opinion as to whether another witness is telling the truth.98 Fur-
thermore, if Type 3 testimony is equivalent to an expert opinion that
the witness is credible, and if the jury alone should determine credibil-
ity, then this type of testimony does not assist the jury. 99 Courts rely-
ing on this reasoning often say that the testimony "invade[s] the
province of the jury" in determining credibility or impermissibly bol-
sters the witness' credibility. i°0
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions allow testimony
based on the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS)
(Type 4).'o1 In many of the reported child sexual abuse cases, the
child complainant has either delayed reporting the alleged abuse,
related inconsistent versions of the allegations, recanted the allega-
tions, or acted in some manner that would seem unusual for a sexual
abuse victim. In 1983, Dr. Roland Summit devised CSAAS as a ther-
apeutic tool to explain the origins of these seemingly bizarre behaviors
in order to negate the inference that these behaviors disprove the
occurrence of abuse. 10 2 According to Summit, the sexually abused
deliberations. Such opinion testimony is competent to prove only that the victim
is exhibiting or suffering from symptoms that have been found by experts in the
field of psychology to be consistent with the child having undergone an
experience of sexual battery or abuse. As such, the expert opinion constitutes
circumstantial evidence from which it may be inferred that the child has suffered
episodes of abuse at the hands of someone at some time. Such testimony,
however, may not be received as corroborating evidence that the defendant
committed the criminal act charged on the specified occasion.
Id.
97. See, e.g., Moran, 728 P.2d at 254-55; see also supra note 84.
98. MICHAEL GRAHAM, supra note 21 at 278.
99. See, e.g., Moran, 728 P.2d at 255 ("[W]e do not believe the jury needs an expert to
explain that the victim's behavior is consistent or inconsistent with the crime having
occurred."); Russell v. State, 712 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Ark. 1986) ("[L]ay jurors are fully
competent to determine whether the history given by the victim was consistent with sexual
abuse.").
100. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garcia, 502 A.2d 253, 257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
101. See supra note 35.
102. See Summit, supra note 7. Summit explained that sexually abused children learn to
"accommodate" the abuse, which allows for immediate survival within the family but
contradicts the common assumptions about sexual abuse. Id. at 179, 181. He classified the
reactions of the sexually abused child into five categories: (1) secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3)
entrapment and accommodation; (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and (5)
retraction. Id. at 181.
Stage 1 is secrecy, an element inherent in the adult-child relationship. The offender makes
it clear to the child that it would be bad or dangerous for the child to tell anyone about the
abuse. Id. Contrary to the general expectation that the child would seek help, sexually abused
children often do not report the abuse out of fear of being blamed for the incident or fear that
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child often is "fearful, tentative, and confused about the nature of the
continuing sexual experience and the outcome of disclosure."' 0 3
Many victims of child sexual abuse do not seek help, make no protest
or outcry, delay disclosure, and then retract the accusation."° This
coping behavior of the child contradicts society's expectations of how
a sexual abuse victim should react to the abuse. 05
Defense counsel may attempt to impeach the child's credibility
by raising this behavior on cross-examination and then using the pres-
ence of such behavior to argue that the alleged abuse did not occur.
This behavior seemingly impeaches the child regardless of whether it
comes out on direct or cross-examination or through the testimony of
the child or another witness. The prosecutor then offers one or more
expert witnesses to rehabilitate the child's credibility by explaining
CSAAS - sometimes explicitly by name, but often only by concept.
no one will be able to protect them from retaliation by the abuser. Id. Stage 2 is helplessness,
the absence of power a child has in a relationship with a parent or trusted adult. A victim
whose compliance was not achieved through overwhelming force or threat of violence is not
necessarily a willing accomplice. Summit argues that the actions or gestures of a parent are
compelling forces for a dependent child. Id. at 183.
Stages 3 through 5 occur as a direct result of the abuse. In stage 3, the child, faced with
continuing helpless victimization, learns to achieve a sense of power and control by believing
that she has provoked the abuse and by hoping that if she learns to be good she can earn love
and acceptance. Id. at 184. This desperate assumption of responsibility may lead the child to
develop accommodation mechanisms including multiple personalities, self-mutilation,
promiscuous sexual activity, and substance abuse. Id. at 185. Stage 4 is disclosure of the
abuse. Children never disclose most incidents of sexual abuse. Id. at 186. However, if the
child does disclose the abuse, the child usually does so after years of continuing sexual abuse
and an eventual breakdown of accommodation mechanisms. Id. A child "faces an
unbelievable audience when she complains of ongoing sexual abuse." Id. Finally, stage 5 is
retraction of the accusation. A child likely will reverse her accusation because the abuser and
other family members convince her that she is responsible for destroying the family. Id. at
188.
103. Id. at 178.
104. Id. at 181, 183, 186, 188.
105. Id. at 178. In one of the earliest reported child sexual abuse cases, the Supreme Court
of Oregon explained this phenomenon:
If a complaining witness in a burglary trial, after making the initial report, denied
several times before testifying at trial that the crime had happened, the jury
would have good reason to doubt seriously her credibility at any time. However,
in this instance we are concerned with a child who states she has been a victim of
sexual abuse by a member of her family. The expert testified that in this situation
the young victim often feels guilty about testifying against someone she loves and
wonders if she is doing the right thing in so testifying. It would be useful to the
jury to know that not just this victim but many child victims are ambivalent
about the forcefulness with which they want to pursue the complaint, and it is
not uncommon for them to deny the act ever happened. Explaining this
superficially bizarre behavior by identifying its emotional antecedents could help
the jury better assess the witness's credibility.
State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219-20 (Or. 1983).
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This testimony is intended to rebut the inference that this behavior is
inconsistent with the child having been abused. In theory, the expert
will provide the jurors, who commonly lack experience with child sex-
ual abuse victims, with alternative explanations for the child's
behavior.106
III. THE APPROACH OF THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS
A. The Development of the Case Law
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania first addressed the issue of
the admissibility of expert testimony in a child sexual abuse prosecu-
tion in the 1985 case of Commonwealth v. Baldwin.07 The Baldwin
court permitted a social worker to explain the dynamics of intra-fam-
ily sexual abuse and the behavior patterns of its victims, the psycho-
logical forces which cause the victim to keep sexual abuse a secret for
a long time, and the reasons why victims often cannot recall exact
dates or times or describe specific incidents in detail-testimony of
the third and fourth types described in the introduction to this Com-
ment.108 The court noted that the emotional trauma of sexual abuse
may cause the child to behave in a manner different from other crime
victims; i.e., child sexual abuse victims often have difficulty remem-
bering dates and times and describing details of sexual acts, appear as
reluctant witnesses, and sometimes refuse to testify or recant prior
allegations out of fear or coercion."°9 Based on the decisions of sev-
106. The expert testimony offered by the prosecution in Middleton illustrates typical
testimony of this type. Approximately six weeks after reporting to a police officer and
testifying before a grand jury that her father had raped her, the child complainant wrote a
statement that she had lied about the rape so she could get "out on her own." Id. at 1216.
Defense counsel attacked the child's credibility by introducing her retraction during cross-
examination of the child. Id. Following this impeachment, the state offered expert testimony
from a social worker to explain that the child's retraction was not inconsistent with sexual
abuse:
Q. [What about retracting reports before a Grand Jury or made to police?
What about that?
A. That is... a very common kind of thing to happen. When a child does do
that .... they realize this is my father ... and I still care for this person.
And look what I'm doing to them ... [and] to my family. And the easiest
thing to do, of course, is to say gee, I just made it all up and it isn't true after
all.
Q. Is any of the behavior that you have learned of [the child complainant], in
supervising her case, different than other sexually abused children?
A. No,.... it's very typical for a teenage sex abuse victim.
Id. at 1218-19 n.6.
107. 502 A.2d 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
108. Id. at 255.
109. Id. at 258.
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eral other jurisdictions admitting this type of testimony, 110 the court
allowed the testimony "so long as the expert [did] not render an opin-
ion on the accuracy of the victim's recitation of the facts.11 The
court found that such testimony did not "invade the province of the
jury" even though it indirectly tended to bolster the victim's
credibility. 1 1 2
The court also noted that, unlike the cases from other jurisdic-
tions allowing an expert to testify that the victim's behavior fit the
pattern of behaviors described, the expert in this case framed his testi-
mony in general terms and did not testify specifically about the vic-
tim. 113 Therefore, the court concluded, it is "even clearer in the
instant case that the expert did not invade the province of the jury
because all the inferences were left for the jury to draw." 1 4 The court
reserved decision on whether it would permit the expert to testify spe-
cifically that the victim's behavior fit the pattern described. 1 5
A year later, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Common-
wealth v. Seese,' 16 found inadmissible expert testimony by a pediatri-
cian that it was very unusual for children of an age similar to that of
the child complainant to lie about sexual abuse. 1 7 Justice Flaherty,
writing for the court, considered this testimony an "expert opinion as
to the veracity of the class of potential witnesses of which the victim
was a member," and, thus, an encroachment on the jury's credibility-
determining function. 1I  Admission of this testimony, the court
argued, would encourage jurors to defer to the expert's assessment of
the truthfulness of a class of people of which the particular witness is
a member, rather than determining the credibility of the particular
110. See People v. Dunnahoo, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Kim, 645
P.2d 1330 (1982), overruled on other grounds, 799 P.2d 48 (Haw. 1990); State v. Middleton,
657 P.2d 1215 (Or. 1983); State v. Haseltine, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. App. 1984).
111. Baldwin, 502 A.2d 253, 257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
112. Id. ("It is a commonplace fact that the testimony of one witness may tend to
corroborate another. Far from being improper, this is normal and is good trial strategy.").
113. Id. at 257 n.4.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 517 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1986).
117. Id. at 922. This is Type I testimony.
118. Id. at 921.
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witness who testified.119 In Commonwealth v. Pearsall,120 the superior
court interpreted Seese as prohibiting only expert testimony that
presumes to pass directly upon the veracity of a particular witness,
while permitting expert testimony that supports the credibility of a
witness inferentially by establishing that a witness' testimony is con-
sistent with the acts and responses evidenced in known child sexual
abuse cases. 121 Whether the testimony in question falls into the per-
missible category would be determined on a case-by-case basis.'22
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court squarely addressed Baldwin in
Commonwealth v. Davis.123 Again writing for the court, Justice Fla-
herty held that testimony by a clinical child psychologist that "chil-
dren who have not been involved in sexual experiences typically do
not fantasize about sexual experiences" was inadmissible. 124  The
superior court had affirmed the defendant's sentence, reasoning that
the expert's testimony should be admitted under Baldwin because the
expert did not expressly comment on the victim's credibility. 25 The
state supreme court reversed the order of the superior court, holding
that the Seese decision unequivocally prohibited such testimony, and
"disapprove[d] [Baldwin] insofar as it conflicts with [Seese] and this
decision."' 126
119. Id. The court expressed concern about the consequences of admitting such testimony:
"[I]f testimony as to the veracity of various classes of people on particular subjects were to be
permitted as evidence, one could image 'experts' testifying as to the veracity of the elderly, of
various ethnic groups, of members of different religious faiths, of persons employed in various
trades and professions, etc." Id. at 922.
Justice Larsen concurred in the result only, advocating the rationale set forth by the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986). See Seese, 517 A.2d at
923 (Larsen, J., concurring). The Azure court excluded expert testimony that the complainant
was believable as "putting an impressively qualified stamp of truthfulness on [the
complainant's] story," but indicated that an expert would be permitted to generally testify
about a child's ability to separate truth from fantasy, express an opinion as to whether sexual
abuse is consistent with the complainant's story, or compare patterns of consistency in stories
of child sexual abuse victims with the complainant's story. Azure, 801 F.2d at 340.
120. 534 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), appeal denied, 568 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 1989), overruled
by Commonwealth v. Garcia, 588 A.2d 951 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
121. Id. at 108-09 n.1.
122. Id.
123. 541 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1988).
124. Id. at 316-17.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 317 n.l. In another case, the superior court found that the Davis decision
"supports and clarifies the distinction suggested in Pearsall." See Commonwealth v. Thek, 546
A.2d 83, 87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), overruled by Commonwealth v. Garcia, 588 A.2d 951 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991). The Thek court excluded the testimony of the Commonwealth's expert that
"[w]ithout reservation [the complainant's] account of ongoing sexual abuse.., is credible" and
four statements relating to the credibility of the victim in his written report. Id. at 88.
Consistent with the Pearsall distinction, the court reasoned:
While there is nothing objectionable per se about statements that the physical
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded the category of
impermissible expert testimony by a 4-3 decision in Commonwealth v.
Gallagher.12 7 In this rape prosecution, the court excluded expert tes-
timony on rape trauma syndrome because "[iut is clear that [its] only
purpose... was to enhance the credibility of the victim.' 12  The vic-
tim's positive identification of the defendant at trial was seriously
undermined by the fact that she had been unable to identify him two
weeks after the crime. The Commonwealth's expert, Ann Burgess, 129
explained how the symptoms experienced by a rape victim following
the attack could affect the victim's ability to identify the rapist. 3 °
Burgess further testified that the victim in this case had experienced a
"flashback" which enabled her to identify her rapist five years later in
court.131 The court determined that the prosecution introduced this
testimony "for the sole purpose of shoring up the credibility of the
victim on the crucial issue of identification."'132
The superior court then used the Gallagher decision to further
restrict the admissibility of expert testimony in child sexual abuse
cases. First, in Commonwealth v. Emge, 3 3 the court concluded that
testimony describing the complainant's change in behavior after the
alleged incidents and explaining how this behavior may be consistent
with having been sexually abused can serve no purpose other than to
bolster the credibility of the alleged victim.3a  Although Davis and
Seese prohibited only testimony regarding the alleged victim's ability
to verbally communicate the truth, the Emge court found that behav-
evidence and the victim's statements were consistent with physical evidence and
statements in known child abuse cases, the expert in this case exceeded the
permissible bounds of such testimony when he went on to specifically state that
the victim 'was credible.'
Id.
127. 547 A.2d 355 (Pa. 1988).
128. Id. at 358.
129. Burgess co-authored an article in the American Journal of Psychiatry which is
credited with being the first study of rape victims to use the term "rape trauma syndrome."
See Ann Wolbert Burgess, D.N.SC. & Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, PH.D., Rape Trauma
Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981 (1974).
130. Gallagher, 547 A.2d at 357.
131. Id. at 358.
132. Id. at 357. In his dissent, Justice Larsen argued that, although he agreed that an
expert witness may not testify as to the truthfulness of a witness without impermissibly
invading the province of the jury, the expert in this case did not testify about the truthfulness
of the victim. Id. at 360 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Justice Papadakos, also in dissent, asserted
that profile evidence of this type should be admitted for the limited purpose of helping the jury
understand the "seemingly unexplainable reactions of crime victims." Id. at 361 (Papadakos,
J., dissenting). He concluded that the testimony in this case was more like that permitted in
Baldwin rather than that excluded in Seese. Id. at 362.
133. 553 A.2d 74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
134. Id. at 75-76. This is Type 3 testimony.
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ioral testimony equally invades the province of the jury. 13- The court
found that here, as in Gallagher, the testimony "would invest the
opinions of experts with an unwarranted appearance of authority on
the subject of credibility, which is within the facility of the ordinary
juror to assess."' 136 However, the court expressly reserved decision on
whether all expert psychological testimony comparing the general
behavioral patterns of sexually abused children to a specific allegedly
abused child is admissible.' 37
A few months later, in Commonwealth v. Gibbons, 38 the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court expanded the prohibition it announced in
Emge. The Commonwealth's expert testified concerning the general
dynamics of child sexual abuse and the behavior patterns of its vic-
tims.' 39 Although the expert did not testify that the complainant's
behavior matched the behavior of known victims of child sexual
abuse, the court nonetheless concluded that the testimony impermissi-
bly invaded the province of the jury. 40
The superior court went even further in Commonwealth v. Dun-
kle,'4 ' excluding testimony based on CSAAS. In Dunkle, the victim's
credibility was undermined by the fact that she had delayed reporting
the incident and failed to recall certain details.'42 The Common-
wealth offered expert testimony to explain these behaviors. '13
Although the expert had examined the child complainant,'" she did
not relate any of her testimony to the child in question. The court
concluded:
In offering this testimony, the Commonwealth clearly hoped to
legitimize the victim's lengthy delay in reporting the incident and
her failure to recall certain details of the incident, thereby allowing
the jury to accept her version of the facts. In essence, this only
serves to bolster the credibility of the victim. 45
135. Id.
136. Id. at 77. The court added that it was "not convinced that a child clinical psychologist
is in a better position to make a judgment on the reliability of a child's testimony than a jury of
twelve." Id.
137. Id. The dissenting judge found that while the Gallagher testimony was similar to that
given in Davis and Seese, the testimony here fell far short of that forbidden testimony. Id. at 78
(Brosky, J., dissenting). Here, the expert never affirmatively stated that the child was a victim
of abuse. Id.
138. 556 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 567 A.2d 651 (Pa. 1989).
139. Id. at 916.
140. Id.
141. 561 A.2d 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992).
142. Id. at 9.
143. Id. This is Type 4 testimony.
144. Id. at 9 n.5.
145. Id.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Oddly, the superior court in Commonwealth v. Cepull'46 seemed
to come full circle back to the Baldwin distinction. 47 The Common-
wealth offered expert testimony regarding the generalized symptoms
of rape trauma syndrome. 48 The expert had never examined the vic-
tim, never diagnosed her as suffering from the syndrome, and never
directly opined that the victim was or was not telling the truth. 4 9
The court distinguished Gallagher on this basis, concluding that "the
expert's testimony did not improperly enhance the victim's credibility
because the jury still had to pass on the credibility of the expert wit-
ness and whether the victim suffered from rape trauma syn-
drome. . . ."150 However, the expert's testimony concerning studies
which established that only three percent of rape victims lie was inad-
missible under Baldwin. '5
Thus, in a line of decisions prior to Commonwealth v. Garcia,'52
the superior court eliminated each of the types of expert testimony
discussed earlier in this Comment. In each case, the court slowly
drove the mental health professional from the courtroom with an
unsubstantiated assertion that the expert's testimony impermissibly
bolstered the credibility of the victim and therefore invaded the prov-
ince of the jury.
B. The Case of Commonwealth v. Garcia
1. THE FACTS
The case of Commonwealth v. Garcia 153 arose out of alleged inci-
dents of child sexual abuse' 5 4 perpetrated by Jose Garcia during 1985
and 1986.' During Garcia's jury trial, the Commonwealth
presented the testimony of two children, aged nine and eight,
146. 568 A.2d 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 578 A.2d 411 (Pa. 1990), overruled
by Commonwealth v. Garcia, 588 A.2d 951 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
147. "[S]o long as the expert does not render an opinion on the accuracy of the victim's
recitation of facts, his or her general testimony on the dynamics of sexual abuse does not
prejudice the jury." Baldwin, 502 A.2d at 257.
148. Id. at 248. The complainant in this case was 10 years old at the time of the rape. Id. at
247. Thus, this case falls within the scope of the other child sexual abuse cases discussed
throughout this Comment.
149. Id. at 248-49.
150. Id. at 249.
151. Id.
152. 588 A.2d 951 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
153. Id.
154. "Child sexual abuse" is used here to encompass all of the charges against Garcia:
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3123); corruption of
minors (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301); rape (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121); and
criminal attempt, rape (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 901). Id.
155. Garcia, 588 A.2d at 952.
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revealing that Garcia had subjected them to multiple acts of sexual
abuse during the period in question. 156 The children's testimony indi-
cated that they had delayed reporting the incidents of abuse. 157
. The trial court allowed the Commonwealth to introduce the
expert testimony of Dr. DeJong, a pediatrician and co-director of the
Pediatric Sexual Assault Follow-up Program. 158 DeJong testified that
one-third of child sexual abuse victims who report the incident do so
within twenty-four hours; another third of the victims do so within
twenty-four to seventy-two hours; and the remainder of the victims
may take years to report the incident.1 59 DeJong also testified regard-
ing the reasons why children delay reporting sexual abuse-Type 4
testimony. 160 DeJong did not attempt to compare the alleged victims
in the case with known sexual abuse victims he had interviewed,16 1
nor did he. render an opinion as to whether delayed reporting was
normal or abnormal in child sexual abuse cases.' 62
On cross-examination of the victims and in closing argument,
defense counsel highlighted the victims' delay in reporting the abuse
as a central element of Garcia's defense. 63 Accordingly, the trial
court instructed the jury on how the issue of delayed reporting should
enter into their deliberations: "[D]elay or failure to make prompt
complaint are factors bearing upon the believability of [the witnesses']
testimony and must be considered by you in light of all the evidence
in the case. ' 164
Garcia was convicted and sentenced to a term of seven to fifteen
years.165 Garcia appealed, and in a split panel decision, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania reversed the convictions and ordered a new





160. Id. DeJong also discussed physical trauma in child sexual abuse cases and the usual
time frame for resolution of such trauma, the typical abuser profile, the methods abusers use to
cover their tracks, the percentage of abusers who are family members, friends of the family,
and strangers, and the enormity of the sexual abuse problem. Id. at n.3. The court's holding
rendered its consideration of this portion of the testimony unnecessary, but the court noted
that this testimony was not relevant to any issue to be proven in the case, and that the
prejudicial impact of this testimony clearly outweighed any probative value it may have had.
Id. Discussion of DeJong's testimony for the remainder of this Comment focuses only on the
portion related to delayed reporting because the court based its holding on this portion.
161. Id. at 954.
162. Id. at 962 (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 961-62.
164. Id. at 962.
165. Id. at 951.
166. Id.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ment before the court en banc.16 7 The Commonwealth argued that
DeJong's testimony was a permissible explanation of behavior that is
beyond the experience of ordinary jurors. 168 Garcia argued that the
trial court erred in allowing the expert testimony of Dr. DeJong. He
characterized DeJong's testimony as an "inadmissible attempt by the
Commonwealth to bolster the credibility of the child witness/victims
who testified against him."1 69 The superior court vacated the judg-
ment of sentence and remanded the matter for a new trial.1 70 The
court held that expert testimony concerning behavior patterns of child
sexual abuse victims is inadmissible when offered to explain the con-
duct of the complainant in a child sexual abuse prosecution because it
bolsters the child's testimony and therefore withdraws the issue of
witness credibility from the jury.171
2. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
At Garcia's trial, the judge allowed Dr. DeJong's testimony
based on Commonwealth v. Baldwin,1 72 which permitted expert testi-
mony regarding the behavior patterns of child sexual abuse victims so
long as the expert did not opine as to the veracity of the child's testi-
mony.1 73 The superior court in Garcia based its analysis of the testi-
mony's admissibility on the premise that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had expressly overruled Baldwin inasmuch as it conflicted with
Commonwealth v. Seese 174 and Commonwealth v. Davis.175 The court
began by examining what was left of the Baldwin holding in light of
its progeny.
According to the Garcia court, Baldwin prohibited only expert
testimony directly concerning the veracity of the child victim/wit-
ness. 176 Seese and Davis "expanded this prohibition to include expert
testimony which commented on the veracity of a class of potential
witnesses of which the victim was a member,"1 77 based on the estab-
lished proposition of law that the determination of the veracity of a
witness is reserved exclusively for the jury. 78 The Garcia court anal-
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 952.
170. Id. at 956.
171. Id.
172. 502 A.2d 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
173. Id.
174. 517 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1986).
175. 541 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1988).





ogized the rape case of Commonwealth v. Gallagher 17 9 to the child
sexual abuse context, and concluded that Gallagher further eroded the
Baldwin holding. 80 The Garcia court reasoned: "If evidence outlin-
ing the behavior profiles of rape victims is inadmissible, we fail to
understand why behavior profiles of child sexual abuse victims should
be admissible."181
The court interpreted Commonwealth v. Emge 8 2 and Common-
wealth v. Gibbons18 3 as further extending the prohibition on expert
testimony that originated in Baldwin. 84 These decisions excluded,
respectively, testimony that matched the behavior of the alleged vic-
tim to that of known victims of child sexual abuse, and testimony
regarding the general behavioral characteristics of child sexual abuse
victims that did not particularly refer to the child in the case."8 5 The
court found that Commonwealth v. Dunkle "6 completed the erosion
of Baldwin by excluding testimony explaining a victim's delay in
reporting the offense.'8 7
In reviewing Dr. DeJong's testimony, the court concluded that
his explanation for the percentage of victims who delay reporting was
an attempt by the Commonwealth to legitimate the complainants'
delay in reporting the incidents.8 8 In the court's view, the prosecu-
tion offered this testimony to persuade the jury to "adopt an expert's
opinion that delay was a normal occurrence in two-thirds of all child
sexual abuse cases, thus eviscerating the prompt complaint instruc-
tion." 8 9 Thus, this testimony impermissibly bolstered the credibility
of the victims and invaded the province of the jury. The court
expressed concern that jurors would be "unduly impressed by an
expert" and would accept his opinion "even though, upon reflection,
they would realize that in the particular field under discussion they
are as much at home as the expert."' 9
The court rejected the Commonwealth's attempt to distinguish
between testimony that focuses upon the psychological processes of
the victim and that which centers upon the behavior patterns of vic-
179. 547 A.2d 355 (Pa. 1988).
180. 588 A.2d at 953-54.
181. Id. at 954 n.6.
182. 553 A.2d 74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
183. 556 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
184. Id. at 954.
185. Id.
186. 561 A.2d 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
187. Id.
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tims.191 The Commonwealth cited Commonwealth v. Pearsall, Com-
monwealth v. Thek, and Commonwealth v. Cepull for the distinction
between expert testimony that directly and inferentially passes on the
victim's credibility. The Commonwealth argued that while an expert
may not directly opine as to the veracity of a witness, the expert may
describe the general behavior and psychological characteristics of
child sexual abuse victims. 192 The court noted that this distinction
had been advanced in the dissenting opinions in Gallagher, and thus
was implicitly rejected by the Gallagher majority.1 93
The court concluded that it was "constrained to hold that expert
testimony regarding the behavior patterns of victims of child sexual
abuse is inadmissible when offered to explain the conduct of the wit-
ness/victim in a case."' 94 The court declared that it must balance
society's interest in prosecuting criminals with a defendant's constitu-
tional right to trial by jury in order to "do justice."19 5 The court con-
cluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had achieved this
balance by prohibiting expert testimony which passes on or enhances
the victim's credibility, and that Dr. DeJong's testimony clearly fell
within this prohibited category.' 96
IV. PENNSYLVANIA HAS GONE Too FAR
A. Critique of Garcia
1. USE OF PRECEDENT
Of course, Pennsylvania is not the only state to recognize the
problems associated with admitting expert testimony in child sexual
abuse prosecutions. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have
limited the admissibility of such testimony in some fashion, usually by
allowing only testimony based on CSAAS or testimony that the
child's behavior is consistent with abuse.' 97 The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, however, has eliminated expert testimony when offered
191. Id.
192. Id. n.9.
193. Id. The court overruled the cases cited by the Commonwealth to the extent that they
were inconsistent with its reading of the Pennsylvania supreme court precedents. Id. n.9. On
the purported basis that it was bound by Pennsylvania precedent, the court declined to follow
its sister states that allow the type of expert testimony at issue, as urged by the
Commonwealth. Id. The court also disagreed that DeJong's testimony centered only on the
behavior patterns of the victims and not on their thought processes. Id. n.10. According to
the court, his testimony examined why the victims behaved as they did, not merely how they
acted, and thus addressed the victims' thought processes. Id.
194. Id. at 956.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
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for any purpose. The main analytical weakness of the line of decisions
culminating in Garcia is that the court has ignored the distinctions
between the various types of possible testimony, concluding instead
that any expert testimony regarding child sexual abuse victims can
serve no purpose other than to impermissibly bolster the credibility of
the victim/witness. In each case, the court used the previous decision
as precedent to summarily conclude that the testimony invaded the
province of the jury without considering any possible distinctions in
the testimony.
Garcia is the only case in the line of decisions since Baldwin to be
heard by the full superior court and to fully reveal the conflicting
views of the judges in the dialogue between the majority and dissent-
ing opinions. The majority and dissenting opinions reflect widely
divergent interpretations of precedent. The majority concluded that it
was "constrained to hold" that the expert testimony in this case was
inadmissible because it tended to bolster the victim's testimony and
thereby took the issue of witness credibility away from the jury. 198
The limited holdings of the supreme court in Seese, Davis, and Gal-
lagher, however, do not require the blanket prohibition on all forms of
expert testimony in child sexual abuse prosecutions effected by the
line of decisions culminating in Garcia.'99 Rather, the superior court,
on its own initiative, "obliterated the fine lines drawn by ... [the
supreme court], ' ' 2o° step-by-step, "driv[ing] the expert from the court-
room in cases involving the sexual abuse of children.''21
Clearly Seese and Davis specifically disapproved the use of expert
testimony that comments directly on the veracity of a particular wit-
ness or a class to which the witness purportedly belongs. In Com-
monwealth v. Pearsall and Commonwealth v. Thek, the superior court
interpreted Seese and Davis as continuing to permit the type of testi-
mony allowed in Baldwin-expert testimony that supports the credi-
bility of the child complainant inferentially by establishing that the
198. See Garcia, 588 A.2d at 956.
199. Unfortunately, about a year after the Garcia decision, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania confirmed the Garcia majority's reading of Seese, Davis, and Gallagher. On the
appeal of Dunkle, the supreme court affirmed the superior court's holding that an expert is not
permitted to explain why sexually abused children may not recall certain details and why they
may delay reporting the incident. Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992). The
supreme court reasoned that expert testimony was unnecessary to explain these behaviors
because they are "easily understood by lay people." Id. at 836. It appears that the Garcia
majority just barely jumped the gun. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 603 A.2d 608, 611 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (superior court relied on Dunkle II and Garcia in holding that trial court
improperly allowed expert testimony describing CSAAS).
200. Id. at 958.
201. Id. at 956.
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child's behavior is consistent with the acts and responses characteris-
tic of known sexual abuse victims. 202 In fact, as recently as 1990, in
Commonwealth v. Cepull, the superior court relied on this distinction
and admitted expert testimony concerning a generalized description
of the behavior patterns of rape victims, while excluding testimony
establishing that rape victims lie in only three per cent of cases.20 a
The Commonwealth relied on Pearsall, Thek, and Cepull in its
argument before the Garcia court. The court, however, summarily
overruled its prior decisions in these cases as inconsistent with its
reading of the supreme court precedents of Seese, Davis, and Gal-
lagher.2" Thus, it appears that the majority interpreted the Gallagher
rape case as extending the holdings of Seese and Davis to prohibit
expert testimony on the behavioral patterns of sexual abuse victims as
well.20 5 In doing so, the court ignored its own limitation of the Gal-
lagher holding in Cepull. While in Gallagher, the expert testified that
she examined the victim, diagnosed the victim as suffering from rape
trauma syndrome, and believed the syndrome affected the victim's
ability to identify her assailant, the expert in Cepull merely testified as
to the generalized symptoms of rape trauma syndrome without diag-
nosing the victim as suffering from the syndrome. The Cepull court
concluded that this testimony did not improperly enhance the victim's
credibility. Thus, the Gallagher decision merely prohibited an expert
from diagnosing the victim as suffering from rape trauma syndrome;
the court did not specifically reach the issue of admissibility of genera-
lized testimony on rape trauma syndrome.20 6
With Emge, Gibbons, and Dunkle, the superior court completely
ignored Baldwin and the distinctions it had carved out in Pearsall and
Thek. The court finally re-examined Baldwin in Garcia. The premise
that the authority of Baldwin had so eroded that it no longer had any
precedential value underscored the court's opinion. Significantly, the
court rejected the dissent's argument that expert testimony regarding
the behavioral and psychological characteristics of child sexual abuse
victims is admissible so long as the expert's opinion does not assess or
evaluate the credibility of the particular victim. 20 7
The Garcia court also slighted the dissent's detailed description
of five basic roles that an expert may assume when testifying in a child
sexual abuse prosecution. The dissent explained these roles in order
202. See Pearsall, 534 A.2d at 108-09 n.1; Thek, 546 A.2d at 87-88.
203. See Cepull, 568 A.2d at 248-50.
204. Garcia, 588 A.2d at 955 n.9.
205. See id. at 960 (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 961.
207. See id. at 956.
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to illustrate the varied purposes for which the testimony might be
offered. 20 8 The dissent described the testimony offered by Dr. DeJong
as "one of the purest examples of the proper use of expert testimony
in an abuse case. '' 2 9 The court, however, characterized the testimony
solely as "an attempt by the Commonwealth to legitimize the victims'
delay in reporting the incidents. 210
2. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
In eliminating the last vestige of expert testimony in child sexual
abuse prosecutions, the Garcia majority reasoned that all forms of
such testimony bolster the credibility of the victim and tempt the jury
to overvalue the expert's opinion. This reasoning embodies two basic
assumptions: (1) that the average juror possesses as much knowledge
as an expert on the dynamics of child sexual abuse and the behavior
patterns of its victims; and (2) that jurors will be unduly influenced by
the aura of prestige of the expert and defer their own opinions to that
of the expert.211
The dissent called into question both of these assumptions. First,
the dissent argued that the use of expert testimony in child sexual
abuse cases meets the criteria for admission of expert testimony in
208. See id. at 958-59. The dissent described five basic roles as proposed by a legal
commentator. See Dirk Lorenzen, The Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony in
Cases Involving the Sexual Misuse of a Child, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1040-42 (1988).
209. See id. at 961.
210. Id. at 955.
211. These assumptions reflect a common theme echoed by many courts when faced with
expert psychological testimony. Courts generally hesitate to accept participation by mental
health professionals in the criminal process. Most of the time, the fields of law and psychology
operate in an atmosphere of "mutual disdain." See McCord, Syndromes, supra note 25, at 23;
see also supra note 63.
The Texas Court of Appeals embraced similar assumptions in Dunnington v. State, 740
S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The state offered expert testimony to rebut defense counsel's
contention that the child complainants were falsely pursuing the allegations under the
influence of the defendant's estranged wife and to explain the delayed reporting by the children
and their mother. Id. at 897. The expert explained that delayed reporting may result from
fear for the safety of the victim or a threatened loved one, and fear of loss of attachment
(removal of child or parent). Id. at 898. The expert also explained that the mother was
suffering from "spousal denial"-the nonoffending spouse's desire not to believe a loved one
capable of such heinous conduct. Id. at 899.
The Dunnington court reversed the defendant's conviction, concluding that "[t]hese are
not such complicated motivations as necessitate expert explanation .... Such elementary and
commonplace sentiments fill our daily lives even outside the criminal justice process." Id. at
898-99. The court also expressed concern that "[t]he disparate expertise of the witness and the
average juror tends to produce a natural inclination to accept the expert testimony as gospel."
Id. at 898. The court harshly added: "Expert testimony is not justified by the expert's need to
publish his work or the prosecutor's need to preclude the jury from making up its own mind."
Id. at 899.
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Pennsylvania.1 2 The dissent explained:
There is a growing body of reliable scientific data to support the
fact that the sexual abuse of children embodies psychological and
societal components that are not generally within the common
understanding and experience of lay observers. The nature of this
abuse is often subject to myths and stereotypes. While a juror eas-
ily might comprehend that sexual abuse can have an impact on a
child psychologically, a juror without some type of expert analysis,
would not be able to understand the behavioral and psychological
manifestations of this impact.21 3
The majority refuted this argument on the grounds that rape is as
abhorrent as child sexual abuse and the behavior of rape victims is
just as unusual as the behavior exhibited by victims of child sexual
abuse. Nonetheless, the court continued, the supreme court decided
in Gallagher that the average juror was competent to assess the credi-
bility of rape victims. 21 4
The majority's view that the dynamics of child sexual abuse are
not beyond the ordinary experience or knowledge of the average juror
finds some support. In 1981, David Finkelhor conducted the only
research to date on the public's exposure to child sexual abuse and on
the prevalence of myths and misconceptions regarding child sexual
abuse. 2 15 The study consisted of interviews with 521 parents of chil-
dren between the ages of six and fourteen in the Boston metropolitan
area. 216 The findings indicated that "the public is relatively knowl-
edgeable and concerned about the problem of sexual abuse. ' 2 17
Finkelhor found:
Some of the classic myths about sexual abuse cited by professionals
212. Under this standard, a court may admit expert testimony "when it involves
explanations and inferences not within the range of ordinary training, knowledge, intelligence
and experience." Seese, 517 A.2d at 921 (citations omitted). This standard differs from the
federal standard, which permits the testimony if it "will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." FED. R. EvID. 702.
213. Garcia, 588 A.2d at 957 (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting). One of the dissenters in Dunkle
H argued that, in eliminating expert testimony on the seemingly self-impeaching behaviors of
child sexual abuse victims, the Dunkle II majority was "ascribing to the average juror
incredible sophistication regarding the effect of sexual abuse on the workings of a young
mind." Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 839 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)(McDermott, J.,
dissenting in part). Furthermore, he argued, the majority "basically trivialize[d] an entire field
of child psychology .... Id. at 840.
Other courts have reasoned that expert testimony is necessary to explain the behavior of
child sexual abuse victims. See, e.g., Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990);
State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984).
214. Garcia, 588 A.2d at 955 n.8.
215. See FINKELHOR, supra note 13, at 69-70.
216. Id. at 70.
217. Id. at 98.
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do not seem highly prevalent. It is perhaps possible that people
never had these misconceptions .... Our preferred explanation,
however, is that people have learned a great deal about the prob-
lem in just the last few years. Whatever myths were prevalent in
the population a few years ago have probably been greatly reduced
by a wave of media attention to the problem.2" 8
Although research has been conducted regarding the public's knowl-
edge in related areas, such as battered woman syndrome, rape trauma
syndrome, and eyewitness reliability,219 a desperate need remains for
additional research regarding the public's knowledge of child sexual
abuse.22 °
The dissent in Garcia also attacked the majority's conclusion that
"jurors . . .may be unduly impressed by an expert, his credentials,
and ultimately his opinion. . . ." The dissent argued that the use of
expert testimony in any case will either bolster or impeach the testi-
mony of other witnesses. 22' The dissent also quoted from Baldwin:
"Expert testimony cannot 'invade the province of the jury' unless the
jury is instructed that it must agree with the expert's assessment. 222
Like the majority, other courts and legal commentators have
expressed concern that jurors will be unduly influenced by expert tes-
218. Id. at 99. Bulkley notes that Finkelhor published his study eight years ago. See
Bulkley, Social Science, supra note 40, at 80. She argues that it is possible that many of the
myths or misconceptions that gave rise to the need for expert testimony in the early 1980s may
have been reduced even further or disappeared altogether, as Finkelhor suggests, in large part
due to media attention. Id.
219. See generally Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social
Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (1989).
220. Legal and mental health commentators express conflicting views regarding whether
the public can understand these behaviors without expert assistance. Melton and Limber write
that "little is known about the degree that laypersons possess ... knowledge about sexually
abused children." See Melton & Limber, supra note 40, at 1229. Bulkley agrees that little is
known about the public's knowledge in this area, but argues that "so-called 'typical' behaviors
of sexually abused children, or a determination that, based on such behaviors, a child was
sexually abused, are arguably within the average person's common knowledge." See Bulkley,
Social Science, supra note 40, at 78. Another commentator takes the opposite view:
"Generally, the dynamics of child abuse are so foreign to the average person that some expert
explanation is warranted." See Karla 0. Boresi, Syndrome Testimony in Child Abuse
Prosecutions: The Wave of the Future?, 8 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 207, 208-09 (1989).
221. See Garcia, 588 A.2d at 957 (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting). The dissent quoted the
superior court's previous language in Baldwin:
It is a commonplace fact that the testimony of one witness may tend to
corroborate another. Far from being improper, this is normal and is good trial
strategy. (Much expert testimony will tend to show that another witness either is
or is not telling the truth . . . . This, by itself, will not render evidence
inadmissible).
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 502 A.2d 253, 257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (citing
State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215 (Or. 1983))).
222. Id. (quoting Baldwin, 502 A.2d at 257).
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timony because of the "aura of science" or the prestige of the
expert.223 Little research has been done to evaluate the impact of
expert testimony on juror decisionmaking in the child sexual abuse
context. However, research on the impact of expert testimony regard-
ing battered woman syndrome, rape trauma syndrome, and eyewit-
ness reliability indicates that jurors do not accord expert testimony
with an unwarranted aura of trustworthiness and reliability.224
Rather, at least in these areas, jurors evaluate the expert's testimony
in light of the jurors' own experiences, common sense, and recogni-
tion of the adversarial nature of the trial process.22 5
Some commentators have argued that expert testimony given by
mental health professionals about human behavior patterns is proba-
bly the least overawing of the different types of expert testimony.
This is because jurors have some innate knowledge of human behav-
ior. 2  The research that has been conducted with cases involving
child witnesses in general suggests that when the honesty of the child
witness is considered critical, as in a sexual abuse case, the child's lack
of cognitive abilities actually may enhance the child's credibility.
2 27
Jurors would not expect the child to have mature knowledge of sexual
acts and behavior, and, therefore, they may suspect that a young child
who testifies confidently about such matters has been coached.2 28
On the other hand, other research indicates that when the key
witness is a child, jurors give more weight to the testimony of other
witnesses.229 When child witnesses appear shaky or uncertain on the
stand, jurors also tend to accord greater weight to the testimony of
experts.230  Furthermore, there is greater potential for the jury to
223. See, e.g., Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 219; see also Serrato, supra note 3, at 178.
224. Id. at 173.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for a "Better Mousetrap", 32
S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 66 (1990). McCord argues that because the essence of psychological
evidence is "not locked up in some mysterious nonhuman device or process," the shortcomings
of psychological research can be brought out on cross-examination. McCord, Syndromes,
supra note 25, at 85. Furthermore, most jurors do not conceive of psychological research as
very, if at all, "scientific." Id. Thus, this type of research is not likely to elicit unquestioning
juror acceptance. Id. at 85-86. In short, "the jury most likely has the ability to fairly and
intelligently weigh the strengths and weaknesses of psychological evidence without being
overwhelmed or overawed by it." Id. at 86.
227. NANCY WALKER PERRY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE CHILD WITNESS:
LEGAL ISSUES AND DILEMMAS 33 (1991).
228. Id.
229. WHITCOMB, supra note 41, at 111. Cf. Gail S. Goodman et al., When a Child Takes
the Stand: Jurors' Perceptions of Children's Eyewitness Testimony, 11 LAW & HUM. BEH. 27,
37 (1987).
230. WHITCOMB, supra note 41, at 111.
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overvalue the testimony when the expert has examined the child. The
Supreme Court of Vermont explained this phenomenon:
We permit mental health experts to help jurors understand "the
emotional antecedents of the victim's conduct" so that they "may
be better able to assess the credibility of the complaining witness."
There is a danger, however, when this "help" in understanding the
symptomology of abused children in general is offered by an expert
who has examined the particular child victim. If the jury knows
the psychologist has examined the victim, his or her comments are
taken in a different light .... [T]he jury sees a concerned therapist
who has examined the child, believed her, and is probably cur-
rently engaged in her recovery process. As a result, the jury may
reach the unspoken but unmistakable conclusion that the expert's
recounting of the assault is the way it happened.231
Thus, while the majority's assertion that the jury would over-
value the expert's opinion has some validity, the research does not
provide conclusive results.
The underlying assumptions of the Garcia court appear to have
some support. However, the available research results (coupled with
the lack of research results in certain areas) do not support the supe-
rior court's sweeping conclusion that no form of expert testimony
offered in a child sexual abuse prosecution is admissible. Arguably,
expert testimony that the child's allegations are truthful (Type 1) or
that the child has been abused (Type 2) presents serious reliability
problems and should be excluded. 232
A more difficult determination is involved when the expert testi-
fies that the child's behavior is consistent with behavior patterns of
known child sexual abuse victims (Type 3). The Superior Court of
New Jersey recently addressed this issue in State v. J. 233 The court
found this type of testimony improper because reliable indicators of
sexual abuse do not yet exist.234 Mental health professionals should
be responsible for affirmatively establishing professional competence
to diagnose sexual abuse based on generally accepted indicators. Fur-
thermore, research should be conducted into the public's knowledge
about sexual abuse and the impact of expert testimony in the particu-
lar context of a child sexual abuse case. Until such a time when these
1
231. State v. Wetherbee, 594 A.2d 390, 394-95 (Vt. 1991) (citation omitted).
232. See supra part II.A.2-3.
233. 599 A.2d 172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
234. Id. at 184, 187. In this regard, the court explained: "This is not to suggest that such
evidence is intrinsically flawed.... Rather, we hold that as social science and jurisprudence
are presently constituted, we can have no faith in its reliability."
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goals are met, courts should continue to exclude this type of
testimony.
Nonetheless, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania went too far in
excluding the type of testimony offered in Garcia. Rather than being
offered to bolster the children's credibility, the purpose of the expert's
testimony was to rehabilitate the children's credibility. It provided
the jury with an alternative explanation for the children's delayed
reporting other than untrustworthiness. Whether elicited on direct or
cross-examination of the child or another witness, testimony that the
child did not report the incident immediately is inherently impeach-
ing. Testimony such as Dr. DeJong's, based on CSAAS, merely indi-
cates that such behavior may not necessarily indicate
untrustworthiness. The ultimate determination of whether the child
was abused by the defendant is, of course, for the jury to decide on the
basis of all the evidence in the case.
B. Alternative Approaches of Other Jurisdictions
Several courts that allow testimony based on CSAAS have taken
specific measures to insure that the testimony will be introduced prop-
erly in order to prevent the jury from mistakenly concluding that tes-
timony on behavior such as delay in reporting is evidence that the
child was abused.235 For example, the California courts have held
that the expert's testimony must be based on literature in the field and
on general, professional experience without reference to the child
complainant or the specific facts of the case.236 In People v. Bled-
soe, 217 the California Supreme Court held that expert testimony
describing the complainant as suffering from rape trauma syndrome
was inadmissible to prove that a rape actually had occurred since the
syndrome was developed as a therapeutic tool and not as a scientifi-
cally reliable means of determining whether a rape had occurred.238
The court, however, suggested that evidence related to rape trauma
syndrome could be admitted to "disabus[e] the jury of some widely
held misconceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may eval-
uate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths. 2 39 An
appellate court subsequently applied Bledsoe to the child sexual abuse
235. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 446 ("There is something fundamentally strange about
saying that since the child denies that the event occurred, it must have occurred.").
236. See People v. Stark, 261 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Jeff, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Gray, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
People v. Roscoe, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
237. 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (Cal. 1984).
238. Id. at 460.
239. Id. at 457.
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setting.2" It found that expert testimony based on specific facts of the
case would subvert the protection against the misuse of expert testi-
mony created in Bledsoe.2
In People v. Bowker,242 a California appellate court adopted two
additional requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony in
child sexual abuse prosecutions that have since guided the decisions of
the other courts in the state. In applying the Bledsoe exception, the
court permitted testimony based on CSAAS, but only for the purpose
of disabusing the jury of misconceptions as to how child victims react
to abuse.243 In order to insure this limited use, the court required: (1)
that the expert's testimony be narrowly tailored to the purpose for
which it is admissible; i.e., the prosecution must identify the specific
"myth" or "misconception" the evidence is designed to rebut; and (2)
that the court instruct the jury that the expert's testimony is not
intended and should not be used to determine the veracity of the vic-
tim's molestation claim. 2 "
Like the California approach, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in
People v. Beckley,245 allowed testimony regarding only those specific
behaviors at issue in the case, and required that the expert limit his or
her testimony to these behaviors. 246 Expert testimony is admissible
only to explain the individual behaviors of the complainant; therefore,
the expert must not render an opinion that a particular behavior or set
of behaviors observed in the complainant indicates that sexual abuse
in fact occurred. 247 Unlike the California courts, the Beckley court
did not require a limiting instruction. 248 Rather, the court noted that
effective cross-examination generally will prevent the jury from con-
240. See People v. Roscoe, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
241. Id. at 50.
242. 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
243.Id. at 891.
244. Id. at 891-92. The next year, the same appellate court held that the prosecution need
not wait for the rebuttal stage of trial to present CSAAS-based testimony. See People v.
Sanchez, 256 Cal. Rptr. 446, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). In this case, the prosecution offered the
expert testimony during its case-in-chief after defense counsel had attacked the child's
credibility on cross-examination. Id.
245. 456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1990).
246. Id. at 406. On cross-examination of the victim, defense counsel tried to discredit the
complainant's allegations by suggesting that her behavior was inconsistent with that of a
person who had been victimized. Id. at 394. The defense specifically noted four instances of
behavior: (1) delayed disclosure; (2) disclosure to a third person outside the family; (3) the
complainant's continued desire to see the alleged offender; and (4) the complainant's initial
tendency to deny sexual intercourse. Id. The expert, who had counseled the complainant on
three occasions, id. at n.7, commented on the four instances of behavior and explained that all
were typical behavioral characteristics of a victim of sexual abuse. Id. at 394.
247. Id. at 406.
248. Id.
19921
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
cluding that an expert opinion regarding the child's behavior indicates
that the abuse in fact occurred.249 Thus, the court should give a limit-
ing instruction only on request.250
Justice Archer of the Michigan Supreme Court dissented from
the Beckley majority because it permitted the expert to refer to the
complainant rather than limiting the testimony to a discussion of the
specific behavior characteristics at issue without reference to the com-
plainant or to the specific facts of the case.251 Justice Archer felt that,
under the majority's rule, the danger was too great that the jury might
improperly infer that the expert's testimony was, in effect, concluding
that the complainant had been abused.252 He argued that the major-
ity "wholly fails to recognize that the marginal probative value of the
expert's testimony with reference to the specific complainant before
the court pales in comparison to the increased and substantial degree
of prejudice a criminal defendant will face."'253 He concluded that the
prosecution could have dispelled the misconceptions at issue in the
case just as effectively without the repeated references to the child or
the facts of the case.25 4
A Wisconsin appellate court has suggested that in order to prop-
erly distinguish between testimony based on CSAAS, which is admis-
sible, and testimony used to prove that abuse has occurred, which is
not admissible, the prosecutor in a child sexual abuse case should
elicit expert testimony in the form of a hypothetical question coupled
with a cautionary instruction to the jury.255 The court posed the fol-
lowing hypothetical question: "Assuming that 'X' had been sexually
assaulted, do you have an opinion as to why she denied the assault
when first questioned by y?"
256
V. CONCLUSION
These alternative approaches demonstrate that it is unnecessary
to completely eliminate the expert from the courtroom in cases of
child sexual abuse. Until the scientific community establishes reliable
indicators of child sexual abuse and professional competence to detect
child sexual abuse, courts are justified in adopting restrictive positions
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 414 (Archer, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 415.
253. Id. at 416.
254. Id. at 417.
255. See State v. Jensen, 415 N.W.2d 519 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin rejected this suggestion. See State v. Jensen, 432 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. 1988).
256. See Jensen, 415 N.W.2d at 522 n.1.
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on the admissibility of expert testimony in child sexual abuse prosecu-
tions. However, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Garcia has
failed to recognize the limited use of such testimony. When used
properly, expert testimony can serve the limited purpose of assisting
the jury in understanding seemingly self-impeaching behaviors of the
child, such as delayed reporting, without bringing into play the seri-
ous reliability problems associated with other forms of expert
testimony.
Courts should permit prosecutors to introduce expert testimony
based on the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome as a reha-
bilitative tool in order to assist the jury in understanding possible
explanations for behaviors seemingly inconsistent with abuse. As the
California, Michigan, and Wisconsin courts have done, each jurisdic-
tion can fashion its own safeguards to protect against the danger that
the jury will confuse the testimony as affirmative proof of abuse. The
best approach would be for the prosecutor to offer an expert who has
never examined the child. This would help to eliminate potential bias
of the expert 257 and to reduce potential overvaluing of the testimony
by the jury because the expert has treated the child. 258 The prosecu-
tor would provide the expert with the general facts of the case-possi-
bly by asking a simple hypothetical question or by presenting the
expert with a report from the examining professional-and ask him or
her to apply the principles of CSAAS to the facts. For example, if the
complainant had delayed reporting for two months after the alleged
incident, the prosecutor might frame the question: "Assuming that a
child has been sexually abused, can you explain why she might wait
up to two months to report the incident?".
This Comment concludes, as did the dissenting judge in Garcia,
that expert testimony has a limited but necessary role in child sexual
abuse prosecutions:
Without question, expert testimony on the behavior patterns and
psychological dynamics of sexual abuse victims can be very preju-
dicial. While we have a grave responsibility to address the many
legitimate concerns regarding the use of expert testimony in this
area, we also must not ignore its tremendous benefits to the truth
determining process. This responsibility becomes all the more crit-
ical when such expert testimony is offered to aid the trier of fact in
cases involving society's most vulnerable victims, our children. If
we can determine on sound evidentiary grounds, that expert testi-
mony is reliable, relevant, material and probative, can we afford to
keep it from the jury in a case of child sexual abuse .... Undenia-
257. See supra part 1I.A.2.
258. See text accompanying note 231.
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bly, there is presently a climate of hysteria in our society which
makes the possibility of false accusation a matter of grave concern.
Therefore,... the Commonwealth must be required to exercise its
discretion with great caution when deciding whether to prosecute
such cases. However, once the decision to prosecute is made, we
must not abandon the child in the courtroom.25 9
LISA R. ASKOWITZ
259. Garcia, 588 A.2d at 964-65 (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting).
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